





BUILDING GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC POWER FOR INDONESIA'S MARITIME GLORY

First Admiral Judijanto






South China Sea Conflict



- ❖ Transformation from a maritime territorial dispute over an outlier sea area with unclear ownership to a regional flashpoint within three decades (Buszynski, 2019).
- ❖ The policies of China and the US toward the SCS have vacillated over time, to the point that China-US competition in the Western Pacific has become the focal point.
- ❖ Indonesia's stance is that it must remain firm and peaceful and that all activities must be under the International Rule Based Order. - UNCLOS




Taiwan Strait Conflict



- China expect to use the latest developments to establish a new security paradigm in the Taiwan Strait, namely through the enhancement of its military operations around the island.
- Any further escalation could have very negative consequences for Taiwan, Asia, and the world. That includes supply-chain disruptions and renewed inflationary pressures.




Korean Peninsula Conflict



- It happened in 1950–1953 and ended as an armistice agreement instead of a peace treaty. Both countries are still continuing to smolder despite attempts at reconciliation talks. And both sides still have occasional skirmishes.
- It turned out very bad because that small conflict between them and their allies started the Cold War which had killed millions of people. Also because each side had pushed passed the 38th parallel.
- The 38th parallel is a circle of latitude that is 38 degrees north of the Earth's equatorial plane. It crosses Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, Asia, the Pacific Ocean, North America and Atlantic Ocean.

Senkaku Islands Conflict




- The Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in China or Diaoyutai Islands or the Pinnacle Islands in Taiwan are a group of eight uninhabited islands and rocks that lies in the East China Sea. They have a total area of about 7 sq kms and lie northeast of Taiwan.
- The dispute is over the claim of Senkaku islands, which are currently controlled by the Japanese since 1895. However, in between 1945 to 1972, the islands were administered by the United States. In 1971, the US handed over the authority to Japan in 1971.
- Since then, China and Taiwan push their claim on the islands and demands the return similar to the returning of Imperial Japan's conquests in 1945.
- Senkaku Islands are known to have abundance of natural resources, rich fishing grounds and are thought to contain oil deposits. It is also strategically important as it is close to international trade routes.

Persian Gulf Conflict

Persian Gulf War

- Saddam Hussein and Iraq invaded Kuwait.
- Worried that Iraq would continue on to Saudi Arabia and the UAE (much of the world's oil reserves).
- Allies met their goal of moving the Iraqis out of Kuwait in about 43 days.
- Saddam Hussein remained in power.
- Iraq set oil fields on fire. Iraq shot missiles at Israel. 200 American troops died. 100,000 Iraqi troops died.
- Conflicts in the Middle East have a destabilizing effect, not only on the military and political situation in the region, but also on international relations as a whole. Their impact is also noticeable in the Persian Gulf region. The major factor of instability in the recent period has been the ambiguous perception by the States of the place and role of their neighbours. Reciprocal accusations of destabilizing activity have been made. Alongside that, there is a tendency to ignore factors of mutual concern.



Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Oil and gas resources

Russia supplies about **one-third of Europe's natural gas**. The opening of **Nord Stream 2**, an \$11bn gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea, would **bypass Ukraine and deprive it of some \$2bn** in transit fees Russia currently pays.



- China, the world's second-largest economy, which has opposed sanctions against Russia and accused the US of "creating panic," is unlikely to take a major economic hit for the time being, according to Tommy Wu, lead economist at Oxford Economics in Hong Kong.
- In fact, sanctions on Russian gas by the United States and its allies could pay dividends for China, the world's biggest oil importer and fourth-biggest oil producer, according to Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Chief Economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis in Hong Kong.
- There is going to be a reshuffling of Russian imports from the EU, which used to be its biggest trading partner before Crimea, towards China.
- Exports of fuel earmarked for Europe, in particular, to be diverted to the world's second-largest economy, although this would take some time, with the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline connecting Russia and China, still some way off.

Asia's geopolitics after Russia's war in Ukraine

- The ability of the US to focus on the Indo-Pacific will be affected by Russia's war in Ukraine, but assuming that the conflict does not escalate further, the region will remain central to US's long-term security and economic strategy.
- China will secure some near-term strategic benefits in Asia from a more distracted US. However, with the crisis also likely to deepen regional concerns about its influence and hasten balancing actions, these gains are far from clear-cut.
- The Ukraine crisis adds another layer to an increasingly complex geopolitical environment in Asia, with widening political and economic divergence between China and the US set to challenge regional governments and international firms.

Ukraine crisis could heighten risks tied to Asia's geopolitical flashpoints

Risk scenario	Probability	Impact	Risk intensity
A security conflict emerges across the Taiwan Strait	Moderate	Very high	15
China moves against Taiwan's holdings in the South China Sea	Moderate	High	12
North Korea resumes development of nuclear weapons	Low	Very high	10
India-China tensions escalate to a military conflict	Low	Very high	10
A major conflict breaks out between India and Pakistan	Low	Very high	10
Armed hostilities break out between China and Japan in the East China Sea	Low	Very high	10
Major clashes break out among claimants in the South China Sea	Low	Very high	10


Intensity colour key: 1 to 4  5 to 8  9 to 12  13 to 16  17 to 25 

Note. Intensity is a product of the probability and impact ratings, where "very low" scores 1 and "very high" scores 5.

Source: EIU Risk Briefing.

Global political risk reached a multiyear high in 2020

GDP-weighted global average of political risk



Source: GeoQuant

CHALLENGES

- The nations who has global influence, and do rejection of international norms.
- The nations who has ambitions and assertiveness present a systemic challenge to the rules-based international order.
- The extensive of military modernization efforts across all domains that will present major risks and potential threats to world peace.
- The use of economic, military, informational, technological, and diplomatic as instruments of geopolitics power for achieving their own national interest without respect to other countries national interest.
- The nations that threatens to disrupt the rules-based international order and to subvert fundamental values of liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL TO CONFLICT

- Free and Active Foreign Policy
- Achieve National Interest
- Neutrality and impartiality
- Compliance with International Ruled Based Order and norms
- Prioritizing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
- Respect to the national interests of other countries
- Having cultural characteristics as a nation that prioritizes manners
- Enhanced cooperation to support peace, stability and prosperity




WHY INDONESIA SO IMPORTANT

1. Indonesia is the world's third largest democracy,
2. Largest Muslim-majority country,
3. The seventh-largest economy by purchasing power,
4. A leader in ASEAN.
5. The largest economy in Southeast Asia.
6. The world's greatest marine biodiversity and its second greatest terrestrial biodiversity.
7. The strategic position as the archipelagic state. Indopacific's Centre Of Gravity.
8. The world's busiest sea lanes — more than \$5 trillion in cargo and as much as 50 percent of the world's oil tankers pass through the IASL, Malacca Strait, and SCS every year.
9. Availability of natural resources and needed by other countries
10. The number of population, attract other countries to penetrate as target market.






Maritime, coastal and inland chokepoints and major shipping routes



Petroleum transit volumes through select maritime routes (2016)



Economic Geopolitics

INDONESIA - CHINA

- China has been Indonesia's biggest trade partner in the past 9 consecutive years.
- In the past 6 consecutive years, China has been the number one destination for Indonesia's exports.
- And for the past 3 years, China has been the third biggest investor in Indonesia.




INDONESIA - USA

- U.S. bilateral goods trade with Indonesia totalled more than \$37 billion in 2021, while bilateral trade in totalled an estimated \$2.4 billion in 2020.
- The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Indonesia was \$18.7 bn in 2020.
- The United States continues to engage with Indonesia to advance economic reform priorities, such as strengthening the investment climate and reducing barriers to trade, such as protectionist laws, limited infrastructure, and an unevenly applied legal structure.



Geo-political and geo-economic ENVIRONMENT for diplomatic activities



Digital dependence makes countries highly vulnerable to any disruption of data flows. Maintaining data flows worldwide is vital to the social stability, economic well-being, and the growth of countries. For example, the disruption of e-commerce, e-banking, and platform services, could cause great economic disruption.

Global geopolitics depends heavily on access to the main internet cables carrying internet traffic between countries and continents. Presently, more than 90% of all global internet traffic flows through submarine cables which mostly follow the old geographical routes used by telegraph cables in the nineteenth century.

Internet cables are a tangible aspect of data geopolitics. Damage to cables can disconnect an entire country from the internet, which can have profound economic and political consequences.

Great powers with very strong digital capability are showing global influence, political and economic

DIGITAL GEOPOLITIC TO ACHIEVE MARITIME GLORY



NAVY CAPABILITY

Modernize strategic and conventional weapons systems and modern integrated sensing systems, C4ISR and cyber defence systems.

LOCAL TECH INDUSTRY

Develop digital capability from both private and govt sector.
TNI AL to reduce dependencies of foreign entity and technology.

CYBERSPACE GOVERNANCE

the process of establishing the architecture that ensures a security programs align with objectives, comply with regulations and standards, and achieve objectives for managing security and risk.

DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY

- Digital sovereignty refers to the fact that a government or TNI AL must establish its authority to exercise its powers in cyber-space, focuses on more tangible issues, such as technological dependence or control over user personal data.
- TNI AL efforts to establish effective digital independent result in two major challenges: strategic and ethical.

NETWORK COLLABORATIVE

From some issues TNI AL need to consider collaborative strategy to achieve the need for establish digital asset management with friendly states.

ARCHIPELAGIC MARITIME STRATEGY

MARITIME THREAT DOMAIN:

- Space based threat
- Maritime cyber threat
- Air based threat
- Maritime safety and security threat
- Coastal based threat



TYPE OF MARITIME WARFARE POSSIBILITY:


- Technology Proxy War
- Space based Warfare
- Maritime Cyber Warfare
- Network Centric Warfare
- Electronic Warfare
- Air Warfare
- Sea Surface Warfare
- Sub Surface Warfare
- Littoral Warfare
- Psychologic Warfare
- Hybrid Warfare



MARITIME STRATEGY


- Naval Digitalization Strategy
- Diplomacy Strategy
- Grey Zone Strategy
- Hybrid Strategy
- Choke Points Strategy
- A2/AD Strategy
- Integrated Deterrent Strategy





TNI AL Digitalization strategy

- Developed cloud computing
- Building maritime Big Data
- Create Integration Digital Assets Management, include AI, ML and Blockchain Tech.



AI can enable command and control systems to identify moments of relevance from among hours or days or surveillance data in milliseconds, something which saves time, maximizes efficiency and performs time-consuming procedural tasks autonomously at exponentially faster speed.



FOUNDATIONS TO ACHIEVE TNIAL DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY

EMERGING

TRANSITIONING

TRANSFORMING

REGULATIONS

that stimulates innovation, entry and competition

Removes barriers and support early adoption

Regulation and enforcement for emerging technologies

Leverage growth and task penetration

SKILLS

to develop, implement, utilize and leverage digital opportunities

Foundational skills, proficiency and basic ICT literacy

Prepare skilled workers and advance knowledge

Broaden lifelong learning in higher level

INSTITUTIONS

that are solid, competent and accountable

Mobile services and monitoring

Public and private systems delivery and engagement


Digital ecosystem collaboration and contribution in policy making

PRODUCTS



DIGITAL ASSET

MARITIME DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

- Old school maritime diplomacy encompasses a spectrum of activities, from co-operative measures such as port visits, exercises and humanitarian assistance to persuasive deployment and coercion.
- Hard power – Navy and Soft power - Coast guards, civilian vessels and non-state groups
- Maritime Digital diplomacy can act as a valve through which any tension can be released without resort to conflict.



GREY ZONE STRATEGY



SPECTRUM OF GRAY ZONE TACTICS

Chinese Grey Zone Tactics by Category and Subtype

Reported PRC Gray Zone Tactics		Taiwan (1995–)	Japan (2010–)	Vietnam (2009–)	India (2014–)	Philippines (2012–)
Category	Geopolitical	15.0	7.0	9.0	9.0	9.0
	Economic	15.0	5.5	13.0	7.0	13.5
	Cyber/IO	11.0	7.5	6.5	5.5	7.5
Subtype	International	7.0	2.0	8.0	8.0	5.0
	Bilateral	19.0	12.0	9.5	7.5	13.0
	Grassroots	15.0	6.0	11.0	6.0	12.0
<i>Nonmilitary totals</i>		41.0	20.0	28.5	21.5	30.0
Category	Military	21.5	13.0	22.0	14.0	17.0
Subtype	General	4.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.0
	Air	7.0	4.0	4.5	5.0	3.0
	Land	3.0	0.0	3.5	4.0	2.0
<i>Overall total</i>		62.5	33.0	50.5	35.5	47.0

Hybrid Warfare Strategy


Hybrid War Strategy in the context of National Defense:

- Hybrid warfare strategies combine conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberattacks with other influencing methods, such as disinformation, diplomacy, and foreign political interference.
- Bringing together all potential decision-making bodies – civil, military, media, and economic – to coordinate whole-of-government efforts.
- Adapting military theory and doctrine with the concept of modern warfare to enable the military to carry out national defense as the main mission.
- Carry out information operations that the government considers important as a process in the planning and implementation of national defense.





CHOKE POINT STRATEGY

INDONESIA



CHOKE POINT



ANTI ACCESS/AREA DENIAL STRATEGY

INDONESIA

A2/AD a military tactic with the central idea that “the best way to defeat a distant enemy, especially if that enemy is superior in overall military strength, is to prevent it from deploying its forces into Indonesian territory from the start..

Anti-Access “those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area.”

Area-Denial “those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area.”

DEFEND THE COUNTRY



INTEGRATED MARITIME STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

1. Multidimension Set Of TNI AL And Others Maritime Stakeholders Capabilities Combine To Constitute The Integrated Maritime Strategic Deterrence Posture Required To Protect Indonesia's National Interest
2. The Concept Will Be Determine Through :
 - Across Multi Domain
 - Across Multi Agencies
 - Across Government
3. Improving Space, Cyber And Information Warfare Capability
4. Maximize your abilities and powers to perform multiple missions.
5. Conduct deterrence interoperability capabilities with other dimensions.




MULTI DOMAIN OPERATIONS (MDO) IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN


MDO is driven by technologies and requires seamless, dynamic and continuous integration of capabilities generating effects in and from all domains

The need for TNI AL :

- Establish Military Satellite
- Develop Cloud computing
- Develop Maritime Big Data
- Autonomous Assets
- Artificial Intelligence
- Machine Learning
- Blockchain Technology
- Quantum Technology
- Laser and Hypersonic Weapon
- Long Range Surveillance and Reconnaissance Assets



Holistic View of the Operational Environment



<http://www.cjoscoe.org/infosite/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Study-on-Multi-Domain-Operations-in-the-Maritime-Domain.pdf>

NAVAL DIGITALISATION





OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)

OSINT uses publicly available data to gain insights and conclusions about military capabilities.

OSINT uses AIS data and Satellite Remote Sensing


Open source exploration can jeopardize the military operations of any state. This is because the data involved are free and often easy to analyse. Anyone with an Internet connection is likely to be able to capture the whereabouts of warships using purely operational parameters. While radar satellite data are not the most intuitive, they provide OSINT observers with another tool for tracking warships. And no fleet is protected from OSINT.






MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY INFORMATION CENTRE (MSSIC) – LEAD BY TNI AL

Infrastructure development program:

- Integrated Maritime Data Fusion Collection
- Integration Digital Asset Management
 - Artificial Intelligence
 - Machine Learning
 - Blockchain Technology
- Integrated Maritime Data Analysis Collaboration
- Sharing Information Distribution



Location and Date	Spoofing Incidents Description
The Southern Ocean, 2008–2018	To disguise her illegal fishing operations, m/v Andrej Longov/Sea Breeze 1/Ayda/STS-50 committed identity fraud by repeatedly falsifying her registry, producing multiple fake signals, and appearing in nearly 100 different locations simultaneously.
Gulf of Oman/Malaysia, September 2013	M/v Ramtin was involved in “spoofing” by falsely transmitting her AIS identity during suspicious activities and deceiving authorities at Karachi port under the name of m/v Hamoda.
Ten global locations connected to one of the superpower states, 2016–2019	9883 suspected spoofing incidents.
The Black Sea, June 2017	Vessel tracking systems placed many vessels near Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port in the nonsensical location, on the Gelendzhik Airport.
The East China Sea, 28 October 2018	M/v Yuk Tung was involved in “spoofing” by falsely transmitting its AIS identity in a suspicious ship-to-ship transfer and deceiving authorities under the name of m/v Hika, which was anchored in the Gulf of Guinea, more than 7000 m away.
Point Reyes in northern California, August 2018–June 2019	Ships thousands of miles at sea mysteriously reported GPS positions in ring patterns off the coast of San Francisco.
Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, 2018–2019	Signal interference, loss of erratic AIS/GPS signals.
Strait of Hormuz, July 2019	A British oil tanker, the Stena Impero, was seized by Iranian forces after the ship was spoofed into changing course into Iranian waters.
Ningbo (China)-Nampo (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), July–November 2019	The m/v Fu Xing 12 manipulated its identity by employing two AIS on board and using four different ship names to disguise its operations in delivering illegal coal and other resources.
Port of Shanghai, 2018–2019	Fake signals caused ships to appear to be moving in ring patterns at short intervals.
Ponce De Leon Inlet, Florida, 2020	Four visual AtoNs appeared on the map based on fake AIS messages.
Elba Island, 3 December 2019	Deliberate spoofing of the vast number of artificial AIS targets temporarily affected the navigation of ships.
Galapagos, July 2020	One of the world’s largest fleets of fishing nations misreported its location (approximately 10,000 km from its observed location) to conceal illegal fishing activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the Galápagos Islands.



RECOMMENDATION

1. The need of Maritime Satellite Platform
2. Naval Digital Sovereignty through Digital Transformation
3. Create Cyber Fleet Command
4. Develop Multi Domain Operation Concept
5. Building Multi Domain Command and Control
6. Develop Maritime Security and Safety Information Centre lead by TNI AL
7. Navy assets procurement priority scale



THANK YOU

